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INTRODUCTION
This thesis deals with the role of the JOS as the principal
military advisers of the executive and legislative branches of the
U.S. government. It concentrates on the JSC’s perception of Soviet
military and political intentions and capabilities in the postwar
era and on the JCS’s military proposals regarding the external
threat. The purpose of the thesis is to assess the JCS’s role
substantively rather than to evaluate the relative role of the JCS
as an agency amongst other key agencies dealing with foreign policy.
Chapter one provides first a short introduction to the JCS;
second, an outline of the role that military men and military
considerations have played in the postwar era, emphasizing the views
on the JCS, and third, the arguments for choosing this particular
focus on the JCS.
Chapters two through four provide a chronological treatment of
the JCS’ perception of the external threat during the first five
years of the postwar era, emphasizing the years 19^6, 19^8 and 1950.
Each chapter starts with a short outline of the conditions and state
of the international system and US-USSR relations, in order to
provide understanding of the situation the JCS was faced with in the
particular year. Each chapter deals with one aspect of the
evaluation of the external threat of particular concern to the JCS.
1
2Chapter two deals with the JCS's perception of Soviet intentions
in the postwar period. First, there is a discussion of the origins
of the cold war and of the military perception; second, an outline
of the setting of the year 19146 in terms of conditions of the new
international system and the state of US-USSR relations; third, the
JCS’s perception of Soviet postwar political and military
intentions; fourth, evidence provided by the JCS for the changing
perception of Soviet threat; and fifth, the perception of the Soviet
intentions, in terms of key individuals in the government.
Chapter three deals with the proposals of the JCS in regard to
military planning. First, the setting of the year 1948 is described
in terms of the conditions of the international system and the still
deteriorating relations between the US and the USSR; second, the JCS
perception of the external threat is noted in light of the first
cold war crises of 1948; third, the JCS planners’ preoccupation with
measures for a general war as a consequence of Soviet military
aggressions is indicated by various warplans; and fourth, below the
institutional level, it deals with the impact of individual services
and key military figures on warplanning.
Chapter four examines the JCS perception of Soviet capabilities
in the year 1950. It examines first the international system and
the deteriorating relationship between the superpowers producing the
first climax of the cold war in the Korean War; second, the
3implications of the Soviet atomic test and the "fall of China" in
terms of JCS perception of Soviet intentions and capabilities;
third, the revision of the perceptions as a consequence of the
invasion of South Korea, and fourth, NSC 68 and the increased
militarization of the cold war.
Chapter five provides a short resume of each of the chapters and
concludes by investigating the sources of the JCS perception.
CHAPTER I
STRUCTURE AND VIEWS
The three key actors in defense decision making are the
President, the Congress and the military, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
(JCS). Despite being the top military advisers the JCS I'lS enjoyed
the least scholarly attention, and the least public attention for
that matter too.(l) Moreover, most of the attention the JCS has
gotten is from people with some kind of professional military
background and affiliation. (2)
The Joint Ch i e fs of Staff
.
In order to understand the JCS perception of the Soviet Union in
the immediate postwar period, it is necessary to review briefly the
origins, function and present form of the JCS.
The Organizational Development of the JCS. The roots of the present
JCS, the Joint Board was established in 1903 following the
Spanish-Amer ican V/ar
,
1898-1900. As it was the case in 19^7i the
4
5interservice board was made permanent to fulfill the need of
coordination between the armed services in order to carry out their
vastly enlarged commitments as a consequence of the wars.
(
3 )
By 1938, the Joint Board had been reduced to a formal medium for
passing recommendations to the two Secretaries between whom
agreement and cooperation was necessary for coordination of the
armed forces, for which purpose the Board had been crested. (iO At
the time of Pearl Harbor the only joint authority linking the armed
services was the President as Commander-in-Chief
,
step too high for
practical purposes which had no supporting staff organization. At
the Arcadia Conference, 22 December 1941 to 14 Januar 1942, between
the British and the Americans, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, (CCS),
was created to coordinate the war effort. According to a paper
issued at the Conference on the "Post-Arcadia Collaboration", the
CCS was composed of the British Chiefs of Staff and their "United
States opposite members". (5) This was the first time the JCS was
mentioned
.
In February 1942, the JCS was born informally by a Presidential
executive order. The JCS was to be composed of the Chief of Staff
of the Army, (General George C. Marshall), the Chief of Naval
Operations, (Admiral Ernest J. King), and the Chief of the Army Air
Force, (General of the Army Henry H. Arnold). As the Chief of
Staff to the Commander in Chief, Fleet Admiral Leahy soon became de
6facto chairman of the Chiefs, being the liaison between the
President and the Chiefs and presiding over the JCS meetings. The
JCS became the central directorate of American military strategy and
operations during the war
. See charts one and two of the JCS during
the war in the appendix. (6)
In 19^7, the National Security Act, (NSA), created the JCS
formally. The NSA of maintained the members of the JCS. The
creation of the NSC and the CIA removed some of JCS's functions.
The Secretary of Defense as head of the National Military
Establishment gave the JCS an additional civilian overhead. (7)
Figures one and two of the appendix illustrate the components of the
National Military Establishment. Thomas Etzold uses the figures in
a short essay on the National Military Establishment. They are one
of the best illustrations of the interrelationship of the components
of the Military Establishment. (8)
The revision of the 19^7 act in 19^9, Public Law 216, created a
Department of Defense in which the JCS was placed. The de facto
chairman became the de jure chairman. The chairman was as before to
preside over the JCS meetings, but had no vote. In 1958, the
chairman was allowed to vote. See charts three and four in the
appendix for the organizational development of the JCS in 19^7 snd
19^9. (9)
Today there are five permanent members; the Commandant of the
7Marine Corps became full member in 1978 after having been authorized
to vote on matters of direct concern to the Marines since 1952.(10)
The Organization of the JCS. (OJCS) is divided into two parts,
the Joint Staff and the JCS staff organization, whose total is about
two thousand military and civilian personnel. The Joint Staff is
headed by a Director who is appointed by the JCS.(II)
The size of the Joint Staff has also undergone several changes
since the 19^17 ceiling of 100 officers, proportionally taken from
the three services. In 19^49 the size was increased to 210 and since
1958 to a ceiling of ^400 officers. In practice around 700 officers
are today controlled by the JCS, because officers can be assigned to
the Organization of the Joint Staff. (12)
functions of the JCS The discrepancy between the formal and the
real function can hardly be any greater than in the case of the JCS.
The NSA established the JCS as the ’’principal military adviser”; in
reality the JCS role is by some called ceremonial.
The JCS was assigned the functions of (a)advising, (b)planning
and to (c) assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense in
their roles as military commanders.
First, the JCS became the principal military advisers to the
President, the NSC, the Secretary of Defense and the Congress. The
JCS has direct access to all of these. For instance, the JCS, by
8tradition, has a prerogative to see the President as a group or
individually on a matter of their concern. Furthermore, the
Chairman is a permanent member of the NSC and its permanent staff
committees
.
Second, the JCS was put in charge of military planning. The JCS
is supposed to provide strategic and logistic plans and give
guidance for the development of the defense budget. Moreover, the
JCS must review the plans, programs and the requirements of the
seperate services.
Third, the JCS was to assist the President and the Secretary of
Defense in exercising their command responsabilities. ( 1
3
)
The reality of the JCS role is very different. First, the JCS
lawful obligation to provide military advice to the key executive
actors is not reciprocated by any obligation of the letters' part to
take it. As a matter of fact, the role of the military advisers
depends on the individual administration. Each President can choose
his own policy in this respect and has done so; the JCS has had to
adapt to each President
.
(1 4) The President only rarely sees the JCS;
in fact its advice is provided via the Secretary of Defense who sees
the President frequently, i.e, several times a week. (15) The NSC
membership does not guarantee influence. It depends on the
President's use of the NSC. For example, Truman did not use the NSC
very much to solve any of the first cold war problems and Kennedy
9and Johnson neglected the NSC in the making of foreign policy. (16)
In fact, according to Korb, the President's relationship to the
military advisers is similar to the relationship to his diplomatic
advisers in the State Department. He mentions that the
relationships to Truman and Eisenhower of Chairmen Bradley and
Radford were almost as close as their relationships to the
Secretaries of State Acheson and Foster Dulles. (1?)
Second, the planning function of the JCS is limited because
civilian leaders often consider the JCS plans as unrealistic. The
plans are prepared by the Joint Staff, which is built upon a
committee structure. Each service has assigned officers to press
their views starting at a low level of the organization.
Coordination is interpretated by the services as ability to comment
as well as to get to answer that all services agree upon. Pecause
of that there is a tendency to agree upon a high common denominator
rather than a lower estimate of needed capacities.
Third, the JCS is supposed to help the President and the
Secretary of Defense in exercising their command functions. There
is some confusion about this point. The Chiefs do not have any
forces under their control. The JCS is excluded from the chain of
command. There is no legal obligation for the President and the
Secretary of Defense to consult or to inform the JCS of decisions on
operational matters. However, the Joint Chiefs seem to get involved
10
when armed conflict occurs, and are usually held responsible for the
consequences of operational decisions
.( 1 8 ) The members of the JCS
did command operating forces until 1953. Then President Eisenhower
announced that the Chiefs were going to devote themselves to
planning and advising .( 1 9) Since 1958, when the Service Secretaries
were removed from the command, the chain of command for military
operations goes from the President to the Secretary of Defense to
the four-star or five-star commanders, and from them to the
operation units of the armed forces. (20) Contrary to what is
commonly believed the JCS is not in the chain of operational command
between the Secretary of Defense and the field commanders. (21 ) The
JCS cannot command. The JCS is a staff organization. They can only
transmit commands. "The Joint Chiefs cannot command anybody, unless
they're lucky enough to have a stenographer ." (22)
In short, the JCS organizational history from the Joint Board of
1903 to V/W II, and the JCS of 19^7 to the present day has followed a
common pattern of development in two important respects: (a) its
creation was rooted in a need for coordination of the armed forces
due to an vastly expansion of American committments and (b) both the
Joint Board and the JCS peacetime role have declined over time.
Since 1953 the JCS is formally the US principal military
advisors of the US government. The members of the JCS are not truly
Chiefs. The planning becomes unrealistic thanks to the committee
structure of the planning groups within the Staff. The JCS is a
staff. The agency does not have any command functions, it seems to
get the blame.
The Role of the JCS.
The lack of attention on the JCS does not reflect a consensus
about the role that the military men and military considerations
were playing in the process of defense decision making, nor is it a
sign of common satisfaction with that role.
There are three distinct views on the role of the military in
defense policy: (1)the role is too great, (2) the role is
appropriate, (3)the role is too little.
The ’Excessive Influential* V iew. The first view is shared by a
group of observers that maintains that military demand and
considerations and military men play too great a part in the process
of defense decision making. They believe in fact that the U.f. is
in danger of 'militarism*. Approaching the subject matter very
differently scholars like Harold D. Laswell, C.VYight Hills, Fred
Cook, John Swomley and Julius Duscha belong to this group. (2?)
Among many others that belong to it, it is worth mentioning Admiral
12
David Shoup, a former Commandant of the Marine Corps, I960 to 1963,
and a journalist, Tristram Coffin. (2^0
The view has furthermore been voiced in public reports like the
Hoover Commission and the Rockefeller Committee
. (25) It was
indicated by a President with high military prestige who in his
Farewell Address warned against future dangers of unwarranted
influence by a military-industrial complex, (26)
Ten years after President Eisenhower's famous warning against
the military-industrial complex, Adam Yarmol insky
,
a former Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs,
concludes a comprehensive study of the social impacts of the
military establishment by expressing a view similar to one held by
observers in this group. (27)
The ' Appropriately Influential * View. The second view is held by
people that think that the military considerations and military men
did not exceed the proper role despite the size of the American
Post-WW II military complex and the complexity of military policy.
Samual Huntington and Morris Janowitz are the most prominent
scholars sharing this view. (28) To this group belongs furthermore
General James Gavin who believes that civilian attitudes and
influence prevail as well as the foreign policy expert B.M.
Sapin
. (29)
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Ihe ^Insufficiently Influential* View. A third view was born when
Robert McNamara became Secretary of Defense and introduced new
working methods within the Department of Defense. This group of
observers thinks that the JCS's influencee in defense decision
making is too little, i.e., that the executive, by bypassing the JCS
on too many occations and sometimes even dictating military planning
prevents the JCS from performing properly the role as military
advisers
.
A few scholars express this view, e.g., John Ries.( 30 ) The group
consists mostly of retired military professionals and former defense
officials such as former Secretary of the Army, Elvis Stahr
,
former
CNO, 1953 - 1957, Admiral Nathan F. Twining, former Chief of Staff
for the Air Force, 1961 - 1965
,
General Curtis E. LeMay and former
CNO, 1961 - 1963. Admiral George W. Anderson .( 3
1
) Lieutenant
Colonel William A. Hamilton III argues that the civilian leadership
during the Kennedy-Johnson era was marked by prejudices regarding
the military. (32) Major Lawrence B. Tatum, however, stresses
erronous assumptions held by the military organizations as the cause
for the minor role of the JCS in strategy-making .( 33 ) Prominent
journalists like Clark R. Mollenhoff, and Hanson Baldwin from the
New York Times express this concern.
(
3 ^) Hanson Balwin had an
experience as a higly placed staff member during the WTJ II Joint
Staff organization.
Recently, this group was joined by some observers expressing
similar views regarding the JCS. A senior writer for the Washington
» George C Wilson, called the JCS a "ceremonial body," a
"bothersome board of directors. "(35) A former defense official, John
Kester
,
analyzes the role of the JCS. He concludes that the
military s role previously had been too little in shaping national
security policy. (36)
A Critique of the Literature on the Military Pole. A critique of
the literature that has been mentioned up to this point is that the
understanding of the military role is constrained, because the
approach was either too narrowly focused, analyzing a specific case
or events of a shorter period of time, or it was too broadly based,
analyzing too many phases and actors to rely on enough information
on one. (37)
It would be appropriate to add that the question of measurement
and specific role of the military had been avoided in the debate,
Korb included. The complex composition of the American military
advice which crosses the lines of the professional military and the
civilian administrators and experts for research institutions and
universities makes the avoidance understandable, yet not excusable.
What does influence mean? And who is influenced by whom? The
overall evaluation of the influence has little meaning.
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Furthermore, there is little meaning in comparing the peacetime
role with the JCS role during WW II, as Huntington does. It makes
very little sense, too, to compare the postwar role with the pre-V/W
II role, because of the fundamentally different international
structure and climate, and the role of the US in international
politics.
Moreover, it is only within a normative framework that it is
intelligible to deal with a notion of an appropriate role of the
military. This assumes that there is some kind of ideal type of
role. An examination of many books, reports, and articles on this
subject reveals that there is very little agreement as to what this
ideal should be apart from the tacit assumption of constitutional
norms of civilian supremacy as a given. The only way to understand
the criticism that respective authors have on the role of the
military is by understanding the tacit normative ideal the authors
entertain for the military .(38)
The Thesis.
The substance of American foreign policy after WW II was
radically different from that before the war. Having been based
largely upon a legalistic and idealistic outlook of the world of
16
international politics, post-W II foreign policy became based upon
’realist’ premises. A geopolitical, ’realist’ outlook which
normally is ascribed to military thinking. It could easily have
assumed that the military was influential in the transformation.
The difference between thinking of international politics in
moralistic terms and the thinking of international relations in
pragmatic terms is so radical that it is reasonable to assume that
the military that is characterized by the latter type of thinking
did have a substantial role.
The assumption is furthermore strengthened by the high public
prestige that WW II military heroes enjoyed amongst both the
Washington community and the public at large.
The influence is further detected by the fact that since klJ II,
substantial military forces have been considered necessary for a
valid foreign policy. About loX of the GNP annually has been
devoted to military purposes.
The Mil itar y Role in American Foreign Policy. It is a matter of
evidence that the American military men and military considerations
have played an unprecedented part in American foreign policy. It is
my thesis, however, that if it makes sense to make a distinction
between professional military advisers and civilian advisers, the
top military advisers of the JCS have had a largely overrated role
in foreign policy after WV/ 11.(39)
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On matter of military expertise, the influence amounted to what
civilian leaders and institutions would allow. Military
considerations have a high position and one prominent American
historian today maintains that the American government must work
within the framework prescribed by the military .(40)
In foreign policy matters it seems to me that the distinction
between civil and military expertise has become blurred. The
civilian element har become militarized and the military element has
become politicized. Diplomatic specialists have become military
generalists, while military experts have become political
generalists. It is more reasonable to argue that this blurring is
the trend than to argue that the development of the civil-military
relationship has been characterized by an increase in influence of
formal military institutions and of military professionals. (41)
The JCS perception of the external threat, of the intentions of
the major opponents, was largely shared by the top-civilian
administrators in terms of values, social causality, etc. V/hile
there was agreement that the threat was real and where it came from,
there was disagreement about what to do about it. Ironically, in
matters of political and military analysis, where the military
advice competes with the advice of the diplomatic specialists, the
military view tended to prevail, whereas in areas of strategic
planning use of force in crisis, weapon procurement, the military
specialists’ view was not as influential as initially expected.
18
Domestic Reasons for the Minor Role of^ JCS. The domestic
components of the complex of reasons for the lack of military
influence will be tentatively indicated.
The military specialists do not have the exclusive competence in
respect to military matters of the peacetime battlefield. The
objective of the military shifted from the effort to win a war, the
next war, to the effort win the peace, i.e., maintain peace. The
traditional strategy of mobilization changed to a strategy of
deterrence
.
(
H2)
During WW II, the the Joint Chiefs were the military advisors to
the President, - the Commander in Chief, - regarding the strategic
direction of the US forces in wartime for which purpose a closed
staff system was created. The JCS organization became independent
of all but the President. This is crucial; it has been argued
convincingly that the JCS role during the war has been somewhat
exaggerated, referring to the fact that on several occasions the
President's view prevailed when the Chiefs were in disagreement with
him in cases such as the desirability of the invasion of Africa,
"Operation Torch. "( 143 ) There is a difference to the state that Fleet
Admiral Leahy perceives when he said in 19^5: "The JCS at the
present time are under no civilian control whatever" (
)
Huntington
approvingly uses this quote as evidence for the apogee of the JCS
influence
.
( 45
)
19
When time came after the end of the war to integrate the
military advice in government, the MSA formalized the status and the
functions of the JCS. This political construction did not have the
same creativity and constitutional innovation as the T.V.A. system
of the 193o's.(iJ6) The committee structure of the JCS organization
was not only a system of checks and balances between the military
services themselves, but the new National Military Establishment
also reinforced a civilian control by placing the JCS within a
relationship of immediate subordination to the Secretary of Defense.
A stronger institutional position was further constrained by a
long American tradition of anti-militarism, which was rooted in the
pre-Revolution experiences with the British occupational forces as
well as the experience of many of the 19th century immigrants, many
of whom had come here to avoid the long service in the European
armies. (^7) This traditional attitude is very strong. It explains
the apparent contradication between the public hostility to arms
manufacturer of the inter-war years and the strong and still present
defense of the ’right* of civilians to bear arms. It makes it
easier to understand the paradox between American attitudes towards
’civil’ weapons and ’military’ weapons.
Furthermore, a stronger institutional position of the military
was constrained by the fear of the German General Staff. (48) It is
worth mentioning that a common belief at the time was that the
20
German Military Staff had been a strong factor for the outbreak of
V/W I prejudiced any counterpart in American government. It was
widely believed that Japanese men had caused the Japanese
aggressions of the 1930's.(49)
Regarding the JCS perception of the postwar period, the
experience of WW II is the most powerful factor determining the
perception. The significant impact of WV/ II experience is found in
the believed (a)need for force to pursue foreign policy, (b)danger
of appeasement in diplomacy and (c)danger of aggression in world
pol itics
.
The Focus of the Thesis.
Any final analysis on the military influence entails an
extensive study of the views of other key domestic actors in U.S.
foreign policy to satisfy the needs of sufficient material for
comparison, but it exceeds the scope of a Master’s Thesis. Here
focus is on one dimension.
The stereotypes on the role of the military in politics and the
lack of studies makes it relevant to focus on the JCS role, not in
terms of influence, but in terms of understanding of their
perspective. The JCS can boast of com.ing to a clear attitude about
21
the Soviet postwar intentions and the role of the US in that respect
- earlier than most institutions involved in foreign policy during
the formative years of the cold war. It was unnecessary to engage
in overt influence. The military's point of view became the
prevailing point of view amongst civilians or non-defense officials.
And that constituted their influence.
The JCS's perception of Uie external threat. A more plausible
approach to the understanding of the JCS role in the cold war is to
link the JCS perceptions of the external threat to JCS proposals of
national defense. In other words, we will analyze the JCS reports
in terms of their interpretation of Soviet intentions and of Soviet
arms and other capabilities - an "explication de texte" - rather
than through an objective approach analyzing the JCS role in terms
of function of coordinator of forces and vested interests. V^hat did
the JCS see? V/hat did the JCS propose? What changes were there in
the JCS perception and what were the consequences for the JCS
proposals?
Concerning the concept of perception, John Stoessinger suggests
the use of four analytical categories: (a)national self-image, which
concerns the question of who the national leaders think they are and
what role they view their nation should have, ( b) perception of
intentions which regards the problem of how national leaders view
22
another nation's intentions toward itself, ( c) perception of
capabilities and power - a category dealing with mil itary .industrial
and human resources in terms of present and future numbers and
skills, and (d)perception of the character of the opponent that
deals with the view of the nature of the adversary
. (50)
For this paper, Stoessinger
' s categories of intentions and
capabilities of the opponent and national self-image constitute a
point of departure. They have been used as analytical devices in
understanding the JCS's perception of the external threat as
manifested in military and diplomatic documents.
The military uses the terms of intentions and capabilities both
in a narrow military sense and in a way indicating the broader
meaning, which includes diplomatic and other non-military dimensions
as well. When the narrow meaning is referred to, it will be
specified in this paper.
Notes
.
(1) The verb is in the singular. Vie refer
institution. The JCS advice is a JCS decision
approved by the Chiefs. The JCS decisions are
footnote by JCS and a number.
to the JCS as an
which has been
indicated in the
(2) Lawrence J. Korb
,
the present Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Nianpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics is author of the
only published book that is entirely about the JCS; Korb, L.J., The
^ Staff ; The First Twenty-five Years
,
(Bloomington &
London: 1976); it incorparates his Ph.D. dissertation, Korb, L.J.
TlTe Role ^ Une Joint Chiefs of Staff ^ the Defense Budget Processfrom 19^47 to 1967, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, (State
University of New York, Albany: 1969), University Microfilms
International; (University Microfilms International and the last
mentioned institutions in each of the following references provided
a copy of the unpublished material for this thesis). In addition
there are the following unpublished materials about the JCS; Barber
III, H.A.
,
The Joint Ch i e fs of Staff as an Input-Output Mechanism,
unpublished Master's Thesis, (Shippensburg State Collegel
Pennylvania, 1972), Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania; Benjamin, Roger, W., Military Influence on Foreign
Policy Making, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, (Washington
University, Saint Louis, Missouri: 1967), University Microfilms
International; Harrelson, Joseph, Shelton, Jr., The Joint Chiefs of
Staff and National Security, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, (The
American University, Washington D.C.; 1968) Microfilms
International. Teeters, Bernard, G.
,
What Should be Done About the
Joint Ch i e f s of Staff? "An individual study." (Army War College,
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
,
1 956 ) , the Army Library, the
Pentagon; Weeters, Peter, The Chairman of the Joint Ch i e f
s
of Staff
:
An Evolving Institution, unpublished Master's Thesis, (University of
Virginia: 1964), U.S. Army Library, the Pentagon; To the best of my
knowledge, Roger Benjamin has had no military affiliation. Bernard
Teeters made his "individual study" while he was a colonel of the
Army. Lawrence Korb served in the Navy from 1962 to 1966; he served
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CHAPTER II
WHO IS THE NEW ENEMY ?
The Cold War and the Military.
Who the new Enemy? Scholars continue to disagree about the
origins of the cold war. Traditionalists - as the official wisdom
of the time indicates - are still in no doubt about the course of
the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States emerging
after WW II. Revisionists blame the US for having caused the cold
war or prompted it for reasons of economic gain.
Regarding any conflict there usually are conflicting
interpretations. Revisionist interpretations have challenged
conventional explanations after each war the US has participated in.
This is not an exclusive American phenomenon. What the cold war was
and what the reason for it was, seeems to depend on the definitions
of the cold war as well as the predominant values enthroned by the
particular scholar.
Whatever reason and label, the common cause for the Grand
Alliance between the Big Three, US, UK and USSR, disappeared during
1945. Tension characterized the relationship between the US and the
USSR on the diplomatic level as well as on the military level. On
30
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the diplomatic level the issues of conflict were the future of
Poland, the UN, and Germany. On the military level the freeing of
prisoners of war, the cooperation in the war effort against Germany,
and the occupation of East European countries caused considerable
frictions. ( 1
)
Few revisionists have dealt with the role of the defense
leadership. When it is dealt with, the influence of the defense
leadership is either exaggerated or disparaged
. (2)
The military leaders and civilians urged constant vigilance
against surprise attach. One historian, Michael Sherry, calls these
collective plans and perceptions "the ideology of national
preparedness”, which, he argues, became an important component of
postwar policy and as such encouraged Americans to define the Soviet
Union as the nation's next enemy. (3)
Cold war rhetoric contained to a large degree perceptions,
images and the traumatic experiences of the 1930’s and the 19^40's.
For an institution such as the military where tradition plays a
predominant role, the sense of time and the view of the past becomes
important, which is a reason by itself for studying how the
historical experience influenced the military's view on postwar
world politics. The organizational interests cannot alone provide a
full explanation for a given perception at a given time.
The "preparedness ideology" thesis is supported by Daniel
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Yergin's hypothesis that the national security is a state of mind -
a perception - which was a response to past experience as well as a
manifestation of a common understanding of the conditions for
general war and practice. (4)
The same scholar argues, in fact, that organizational interests
were another source of the military's exaggerated perception of the
Soviet intentions and capabilities, i.e., the need of the armed
forces to make the American position credible. (5)
Another scholar, a political scientist, R.K. Betts, rejects the
claim that bellicose generals - an attitute steoreotypically
attributed to military men - prompted the cold war by seeking
conflicts with the Soviets, (6) His study of cold war crises shows
that there is little evidence of consistent differences - in terms
of "aggressiveness", i.e., willingness of recommending use of force
as a means to resolve a given crisis - in the recommendations of
soldiers and statesmen
. (7 ) Against Betts' conclusions three
objections can be raised: first, the cold war crises from the Berlin
Blockade in 1948 to the Christmas Bombing of Hanoi of 1972 are the
evidence for Betts' interpretation ; (8) his results may however
derive from conditions especially unique for crisis decisions; does
the focus of the crises provide enough information to understand the
general character of the attitudes? Would such information provide
enhanced understanding of these crises? I think so. A second
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objection is that defense officials do have a unique institution
supporting them, the Pentagon. And third, non-defense officials
concerned with foreign policy were conditioned by the cold war to
think in perspectives often attributed only to military men. (9)
It would thus be interesting to investigate the military
advisers’ attitudes and perceptions regarding the external threat to
the USA. Do secret and top secret documents of the time reveal any
different perception from the already known anxiety? If there is,
would it thus be an indication of an attempt to create a public mood
in favor of military spending and establishment and maintenance of a
large standing army? Another vital aspect of the study is the
evidence the military have for aggressive Soviet intentions.
The questions that this study adresses itself to are (a)what did
the military advisers, the JCS, believe the Soviets were up to,
i.e., what did the JCS expect to happen regarding the Soviet Union,
and what did the JCS think the Soviets could do, and (b)what were
the reasons for this perception?
1
Instead of asking whether a bellicose attitude of military men
prompted the cold war, we will ask whether the alarmist perception
of defense officials regarding Soviet intentions and capabilties
prompted the cold war. A first step towards an answer would be to
detect whether the alarmist perception differ consistently between
defense and non-defense officials.
In sum, this paper will deal with the JCS role in US national
policy in terms of the JCS perception of the Soviet intentions and
capabilities during the first years of the cold war emphasizing the
years 19^16.948 and 1950. The focus will be on:
(Dwhat were the JCS perceptions of the Soviet intentions?
(2)
what were the JCS perceptions of Soviet military and economic
capabilities?
3)
what was the JCS perception of US intentions and
capabilities?
(4)
which sources for the perception are indicated in the JCS
documents and other documents for evidence for (a)historical
experience, (b)WW II, (c)organizational interests, the inter-service
rivalry (d)role of nuclear weapons and (e)conflict over strategy.
The Setting 1 946.
The Postwar International System. At the conclusion of WW II, the
USSR and the US emerged in a class by themselves. The postwar
international system became characterized by the conflict between
these two superpowers in all dimensions of the system.
The Inter-State Relations. WW II brought a radical change in the US
foreign and military policy as well as her relationship to the USSR.
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In American policy, collective security and preparedness replaced
isolation and disarmament as US principles for preventing war.
Collaboration with allies during the war developed into
participation in the United Nations; Lend-Lease Aid to the Allies
developed later into the Marshall Plan and economic aid to friendly
and neutral countries.
The relationship to the USSR changed from difficult
collaboration to a relationship of confrontation regarding major
issues in world politics.
The JCS Perception of Soviet Intentions.
The Early JCS Perception of External Postwar Threat. The new
contours of world politics did not come as a surprise for the
American military advisers in the JCS. A JCS report to the State
Department in 19M4 had forecast the new world conditions. Likewise,
forecast was an increasing degree of tensions between the USSR and
the US as the common goal for the war-effort became less
meaningful
. ( 10)
From early 19^5, a series of intelligence reports were made in
order to estimate Soviet postwar intentions and capabilities. The
«
JCS was warned about dangers of misperception and miscalculation:
"With the history of foreign s upon the USSR and the legacy of
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the Marxian ideology, the Soviet leaders will probably overemphasize
any British or American expansionist tendencies and exaggerate the
possibility of aggression against the USSR from any quartered 1)
The reasoning behind the JCS's refusal to approve any of General
Deane and Harriman's proposals from the US Embassy in Moscow shows
that the JCS took the JIC warning of counterproductive effects
seriously. (12)
It is important to note that the JCS seems cautious regarding
the perception of the Soviet Union during this first period of the
postwar era. Despite a considerable number of intelligence reports
there is no JCS decision concerning the postwar threat to the US,
before a report was requested.
February 19^6. February 1946 is a turning point in the
perception of the Soviet intentions amongst American governmental
officials. According to Samuel Huntington, the London Conference in
the fall of 1945 was a turning point in the relationship between the
USSR and the US, because for the first time a stalemated "London
Council of Foreign Ministers” adjourned without issuing a
protocol .( 1 3) The breakdown of the conference is reflected in the
JIC and JSSC reports of the fall of 1945. They are more pessimistic
regarding the prospects for diplomatic solutions of the problems by
showing a growing dismay over Soviet foreign policy. (14) The JCS
asked its planners, JSP, to study areas in which the US could stop
an attempted Soviet aggression .( 15)
At any rate, only after a series of reports from the strategic
and intelligence committees of the JCS organization, the JCS
cautiously decided upon an evaluation of the external dangers to
peace and to the US, when they were requested to make comments from
the military perspective on the State Department paper of December
19^5 dealing with the postwar foreign policy of the US. (16)
The JCS word was forwarded to the SWNCC on February 21. The
State Department received Kennan's "Long Telegram" the next day,
which turned out to become one of the single most influential papers
within the government explaining Soviet behavior. Telegram no. 511
from George Frost Kennan, charge d'affaires at the American Embassy
in Moscow, contained a 8,000 word long analysis of the sources of
Soviet behavior as well as some proposals for US countermeasures. A
traditional Russian feeling of insecurity, according to Kennan,
determined the Soviet outlook on world affairs. The Marxist
ideology provided strong hostility against capitalism. The two
sources produced an uncompromising attitude in world affairs and an
open-ended need for security. It could be dealt with by a united
Western world, which had become morally and economically strong
after the US had taken the responsability. Force was a key element.
The Soviets did not understand the logic of reason, but were
sensitive to the logic of force. (17)
During the war the JCS was reluctant to spell out its perception
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of Soviet postwar intentions. The JCS now perceived the
consolidation and the development of Russian power as the greatest
danger to the US. It posed an indirect threat, however, because the
danger for the US was to become involved in a clash between an
expansionist Soviet Union and a still grasping Great Britain.
Concerning the JCS perception of the political role of the US,
the JCS did not state that the US should become a mediator between
the USSR and Great Britain, as they had done during the war to help
minimize the chances for an expected clash. If anything, the US
should rather support, through economic means, nations that were
endangered by Soviet expansion. Collaboration with the Soviet Union
was still perceived as possible, i.e., a tacit indication that the
conflicts were not considered as unresol vable. There should, on the
other hand, be no compromise of principle regarding further Russian
influence in the Europe and the Far East.
Regarding the role of the UN, the JCS did not regard the
organization as an effective prevention of war, because of a lack of
power and procedure to settle major conflicts. In order to prevent
a war, the US should instead have the ability to back its policy
with force. The JCS began to think in terms of the lack of
preparedness in case of a general war, as well as the credibility of
an opposing attitude vis-a-vis an only partly demobilized Soviet
Union. Being the strongest military power potentially, the time for
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a general mobilization would not be long enough in case of a sudden
attack, because the geographical isolation was no longer a factor
nor was the Allies’ ability to hold potential enemies at bay long
enough. In general, the JCS recommended that the American
government take a firm and friendly attitude towards the Russians,
but emphasizing the firmness. ( 18)
In short, the JCS overall image of the Soviet Union was mixed.
The Soviet Union was an expansionist power, but it was Russian not
communist expansion. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning
that up to this point the JCS perception on the institutional level
did not reveal alarm, but rather concern over the prospects of
having to confront the Soviet Union in conflicts ahead. In fact the
real concern seems to have been the US's own military capabilities
due to the rapid demobilization that was taking place, at a rate
that exceeded the military plans made during the war. (19)
The Clifford Report. In July, Clark M. Clifford, Special
Counsel to the President, requested JCS recommendations based on
Soviet activities that had affected American security
. (20) The
request came as a convenient opportunity for the JCS to express its
concern with which it had watched the growing Soviet expansiveness
since the Japanese surrender
. (21
)
The Clifford report is significant in more than one respect. (22)
Although it was never circulated outside the White House, it is the
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first government paper which sought a comprehensive policy regarding
the Russians. It was edited by Clifford and George Elsey, a White
House administrative assistant, who based their paper on reports
from several agencies including the Departments of State, War Navy,
the JCS, the Attorney General and the Director of Central
Intelligence. Secondly, it contained all the major elements of what
later would become the containment policy under the label of the
Truman Doctrine. Furthermore, the report revealed a sense of alarm.
When the report was handed to the President in the late summer,
Truman read the report overnight and first thing the next morning
ordered the remaining copies be placed in his safe; leaks would
damage efforts to improve the relationship with the Russians, he
said according to daughter Margaret
. (23)
According to the JCS historians, the final report was basically
the JCS report sent to Clifford, which he slightly edited, assisted
by Elsey, The report can thus be taken as an accurate reflection of
the JCS stand on the issue at the time.
The goal of Soviet foreign policy was now seen as endless
expansion, i.e., world domination. War would be inevitable, since
the Soviets viewed peaceful coexistance in the long run as
impossible. The report says bluntly that the Soviet Union was
engaged in aggressive militaristic imperialism, preparing the best
possible position for the inevitable conflict. As a matter of fact.
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the Soviet Union would use every means short of war to obtain her
objectives, i.e., subjugate satellites, control strategic areas,
isolate and weaken '•capitalist" nations militarily, thwarting every
US effort to secure peace settlement, keeping "excessively large"
forces in occupied areas - the forces in Eastern Europe deployed
offensively against attack on Western Europe or Turkey. According
to the report, the Soviet undertook frantic efforts to overcome the
US lead in military technology; it was furthermore creating economic
dependency in areas under its influence, by demanding exorbitant
reparations. On top of all this, the Soviet Union was said to be
using religious groups in the Middle East, and the communist party
in the US, by encouring strikes, espionage and violent propaganda
attacks
.
The Soviet military policy sought to erect a perimeter of client
states and trusteeships around themselves. In addition to the
military domination east of a "Stettin-Trieste" line, the Soviet
Union sought to draw all of Germany and Austria into the sphere of
influence, frustrating the formation of any West European bloc. In
Greece, Turkey and Iran "friendly" governments should be in place;
in the Far East the Soviets would try to neutralize China, Korea and
Japan
.
The JCS proposed that the US should create strong military
forces, because that would be the only sure guarantee for peace. In
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fact the US should try to restrain the Soviet influence, and should
accord generous economic assistance and political support to all
nations not within the Soviet sphere, (24)
The JCS had a dominant role in the drafting of an
interdepartmental definition of the containment policy. Compared to
the previous JCS perception of Soviet intentions, the JCS had gone
from a moderately concerned perception during the war, to a
concerned attitude during the first postwar months, to an alarmist
perception during the sumramer of 1946.(25)
The JCS perception seemed to focus on Soviet intentions rather
than an estimate of Soviet military and economic capabilities; i.e.,
the focus on what they feared the Soviets would do rather than what
the JCS thought the Soviets could do. An example are the various
plans that the JCS estimated would be applied for a possible Soviet
invasion of Italy and Spain.
Why did the JCS change its perception from being concerned
during the winter of 1945-46 to becoming alarmed by the Soviet
foreign policy during the summer of 1946? From perceiving the
Soviet Union as a Russian expansionism, the JCS saw now an aggresive
Soviet imperialism. (26) (27)
The JCS Comments on Soviet Demands on Turkey. The Soviet demands on
Turkey during 1945 and those made in 1946 created a different
response by the JCS, and provide a good case of detecting the
dif*f6rence in reasoning regarding the Soviet motives.
TTie Soviet Demands £n Dardanelles. For the preparation of
the Potsdam Conference, the JCS had been requested to provide
military comments on the Soviet demands on the Straits. Two papers
were prepared by members of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee,
(JSSC); Major General Fairchild and Lieutenant General Embick made
one and Vice Admiral Willson made the other. The two papers had
almost similar conclusions but different premises regarding the
appraisal of Sovet motives.
The disapproved majority, Fairchild and Embick, argued that the
demands on the Dardanelles should be seen as a continuation of
Russian historical aspirations. The motives had thus a moral
justification. The Mediterranean was no longer a British lake, said
Embick and Fairchild, regarding the effects on the position of Great
Britain which had had these ambitions in the past. The two members
of the JSSC said moreover that avoidance of a UK-USSR conflict was
needed in order to preserve peace. This argument to preserve peace
was similar to the one the JCS made in 19^^. (28) Finally, the
majority paper questioned how the US could oppose the Soviet
demands, when US wanted bases in Iceland, in the Pacific and the
Azores. (29)
The approved minority opinion, - provided by Vice Admiral
Russell Willson, - argued, in contrast to earlier JCS endeavors for
consensus in order to maintain a united war effort, that the US
could oppose such demands, because the Soviet Union economic
capabilities after the war, the poor state of which made the Soviets
need American assistance and support to reestablish the economy.
Furthermore, the demands on Turkey, like those on Bear Island and
Stitzbergen were demands of a different nature than those previously
made, because the Soviet Union could not back up the new ones with
force, i.e., they were outside the occupied areas. (30)
It was estimated that the US and Great Britain could oppose
successfully Russian effort to seize the areas by force. However,
the Russian effort would decline the more distant the demanded area.
It was the new nature of the demand as well as the stated Russian
interest in preventing a break with the US, because of the need for
US capital and other economic support and the declining rate by
which the Soviets could back their demand, that formed the premises
for the JCS proposal to Truman at Potsdam. The proposal was to
defer any final decision or, if that were not feasible, to support
demilitarization of the Straits, but to oppose bestowal of base
rights upon any foreign power. At the JCS meeting Admiral Leahy
reported that the State Department supported the idea that the
Straits should become a free waterway. The JCS approved Willson’s
minority paper and sent it to the State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee
. ( 31
)
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Retrocession of and Ardahan. In the spring of 19H6,
the Soviet Union began making demands on Turkey in addition to those
she had made in connection with the Dardanelles. The Soviets asked
Turkey to retrocede the Kars - Ardahan region which were two
provinces bordering the the Soviet Union. The demand was refused by
Turkey and the Soviet Union placed a considerable contingent of
troops on the border.
(
32 )
Having been requested to give military comments on the
implications of the Soviets demands, the JCS memo to the State
Department stated that the demands were a clear manifestation of the
Soviet desire to dominate the Middle East and the Eastern
Meditararnean
.
(
33 )
As for the demands of the bases near the Dardanelles, the Soviet
Union had no legitimate need for these bases in either peace or war;
in case of war, she could close the Straits without these bases,
i.e., the bases would not improve the military position of the
Soviet Union. The demands were therefore not based upon a defensive
attitude. They indicated an intention to establish exclusive
control over the Dardanelles and the Persian Gulf. Accepting these
demands would lead to others aimed at the control over the Aegean
area; agreement to the Soviet demands in this instance sets the
stage and furnishes the basis for further well-timed territorial
demands
.
Soviet demands would
According to the JCS, an acceptance of the
lead to consequences which we can categorize as follows: (a)
threaten the British Empire as the last bulwark between US and
Soviet expansion, (b)undermine nations' confidence in the UN,
(c)appeasement in the current view would inevitably lead to war,
according to the popular view of the early post WW II era.
"Public opinion against and repugnance to such a policy have led
us into two wars in the last thirty years against those who held to
the principle of "Might Makes Right. "(34)
The Perception of Soviet Intentions by Key Individuals.
Up to this point we have only dealt with the perception of the
Soviet intentions after the war, as these were seen through
institutional papers, especially the JCS. The JCS consists of the
three services, which may have different functions in the war,
different experience during the past war and different
organizational interests, which may lead them to a different
perception of the Soviet threat. According to Jervis it is
difficult to separate interests from perception. (35) From the
objective perspective, one can ask whether the military with vested
interests in peacetime preparedness was detecting Soviet intentions
as expansionist earlier than other foreign policy actors.
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We will look at the degree of concern with which key officials
expressed or are said to have expressed concern about the Soviet
postwar intentions and to what degree this concern was expressed.
We will examine whether they were alarmed, deeply concerned,
moderately concerned, or were indifferent to the Soviet intentions.
This study is largely based upon secondary literature.
During War
.
During the war, the military lacked a consensus
on vrtiat threat the Soviet ally posed. (36) Army planners identified
no specific enemy in the planning. Unlike the Army Air Force and
the Navy, the Army planners thought the U.S. could be attacked from
sny side. Despite that the Red Army was the most obvious threat to
American security interests; army planners did not agree with the
distrust of the Russians that shared by the Army Air Force and the
Navy. (37)
Among military junior officers, there was also a different
perception than the official JCS view. Such concern is reflected in
professional military journals in a debate concerning the cause of
WW II and the possibilities of avoiding similar mistakes in the
postwar era, (38) First lieutenant Riley Sunderland expressed one
such view. He makes a correlation between surprise attacks and
totalitarian regimes, because of their semimobilization in
peacetime. (39)
At the end of the war, there was a considerable diversity in the
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views on Soviet intentions amongst key military figures. Secretary
of the Navy James Forrestal's alarmed view of the Soviet intentions
is well known. It is uncertain how far back Forrestal’s Russophobia
dates. (40) There is no doubt of its early intensity. Forrestal
initiated at the end of 1945 a survey to determine whether Stalin
had a blueprint for world conquest similar to Hitler's Mein Kampf.
After George Kennan's "Long Telegram," Forrestal became an
enthusiastic Kennan booster, despite that Kennan stressed that the
Soviet Union did not work by a fixed plan. He played a central part
in getting an updated version published in Foreign Affairs which
became known as the "Mr. X " article in 1947.
Perceiving the Russians at first hand, Forrestal had such
allies, vrtio distrusted Soviet behavior, as Ambassador Averell
Harriman and head of the Military Mission of the Embassy in Moscow,
General John Deane. In Washington, the alarmed view was rare among
key officials of the government such as Assentant Secretary of War
John McCloy.(41) McCloy's chief. Secretary of War, Henry Stimson was
not alarmed but deeply concerned. The alarmist view was expressed
by experts in the War Department who argued for "countermeasures in
the anticipation of another world war. "(42) Also staff in the
Department of State voiced a concerned view about Soviet intentions.
Secretary of State Stettinius was less concerned than his Russophobe
Under Secretary Joseph Grew. But both argued for an unyielding
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stand against supposed Soviet expansion in the late spring of
1945.(43)
The firm stand concerning Soviet penetration into Western Europe
did not reflect a panic nor a clear idea of Soviet intentions in the
top military command. Admiral Leahy and General Arnold showed both
a deep concern, whereas Admiral King did not express any stand.
This was due to King's sharp distinction between military and
political matters. He regarded any views of Soviet postwar plans to
belong to political matters. General Marshall's views on
Soviet-American relations were less precise than those of his
collagues. Marshall saw little reason to distrust the Russians
arguing that the Soviet uncooperative behavior stemmed from a need
of maintaining security. (44) General Eisenhower expressed a similar
view. But George Patton was deeply alarmed about the prospects of
dealing with a "scurvy race" of "Mongoloan Savages" every one of
them "an all out son of a bitch, a barbarian and a chronic drunk"
who would conspire with the Jews and others to communize Europe and
America. "(45) However, Patton was amuzing rather than persuasive
among colleagues. The view expressed by Marshall and Eisenhower
prevailed amongst senior officers of the Army.
The perception of Soviet intentions during the war shows two
important characteristics, (a)a hardline alarmist view regarding
Soviet behavior towards world domination and a softline concerned
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view regarding Soviet behavior seen as motivated by national
interests; these did not ssplit according to the defense or
non-defense affiliation of the officials; and ( b) lower-ranking
officials in the staff, both in defense and non-defense, seemed more
likely to take a hardline view than their chiefs.
» After the war had ended this trend continued.
The number of deeply concerned as well as concerned officials grew.
As Soviet-American relations were disintegrating, military men
viewed events in the fall of 1945 as part of an alarming pattern.
Stalinist Russia appeared to more and more military men as an enemy
bent on world domination; in the services, this number grew in the
Navy and the Army Air Force more than in the Army.
Eisenhower was appointed Army Chief of Staff in November 1945.
He maintained his soft outlook. Eisenhower argued in front of the
House Military Affairs Committee: "Russia has not the slightest
thing to gain by a struggle with the U.S.(46)
Kennan’s "Long Telegram" was widely destributed. In addition to
James Forrestal's active promotion of the view, it was also promoted
by Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Also Secretary of State
Byrnes liked it, as did Freeman Matthews, director of the Office of
Eurof>ean Affairs. In fact, it expressed what many already
believed
. (47) But not all liked the Kennan view. General Lucius
Clay was in sharp disagreement. Also Clay's adviser in the State
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Department, Robert Murphy did not believe in imminent Soviet
aggression. (H8) Yergin demonstrates however, that Clay's view by
late spring of 19^6 had become an increasingly lonely view.
Eisenhower continued to be relatively optimistic about Soviet
intentions and skeptical about Soviet capabilities to crush US
forces in Europe. "I don't believe the Reds want war. What can
they gain now by armed conflict? They have gained what they can
assimilate. They need a strategic air arm and a Navy," said
Eisenhower to Truman during a meeting in the White House in June
19^6.(49) This demontrates again that even when the JCS had
approached a deeply concerned outlook by the summer of 19^<6, the
Chief of the Army still continued to be a softliner.
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CHAPTER III
PLANNING FOR WAR
The Setting 1948.
International System
.
By 19^8, the trend that emerged from WW
II had continued to develop; the leading powers of the former
Eurepean system were either defeated or economically and militarily
devastated. The international system became increasingly
characterized by the US and the USSR as the major antagonists, who
each engineered a political alignment in the system. This had
become clear when the British economic problems surfaced in 1947-48 .
The Inter-State Relation. The period 1947-48 saw the final break in
the relations between the wartime allies. The political break was
manifested by the Truman Doctrine, a political proclamation of
containment, and by the Russian refusal to accept the offer of
economic assistance from the Marshall Plan in June 19^8. In 19^8
the coup in Prague and the Berlin Blockade sent shockwaves of war
fear throughout the world. Previously undecided nations made up
their minds from which super power to seek protection in case of
war. A few remained strictly neutral.
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The JCS Perception £f^ External Threat.
TjTe Effects of^ 1
.
9^8 crises. Only one government paper was a
clear product of the crisis atmosphere caused by the spring crisis
and the fear of war.(l) The NSC 7 was an attempt to raise an
argument for the need for an American counteroffensive against
communism. The hardline image of Soviet motives continued. The
parallel to Hitler'ss achievements was indicated by the NSC 7's
reference to Stalin's policy saying that Stalin had come close to
get what Hitler failed to obtain. (2)
TT^ Prague Coup. There is no sign that the Prague Coup caused
alarm at the JCS level. Perhaps it was expected that the Soviet
Union would try to stabilize her position in Eastern Europe.
Several intelligence studies assumed that. (3) Or perhaps the Chiefs
were more occupied settling their own disputes over the wartime
functions of the three services. Herken makes this point, indicating
that the sense of emergency was not perceived as threatening enough
for the Chiefs to arrive at a conclusion at Key West later in
March. (4)
Apart from a hurried drafting of an extended version of
"Grabber", - a Short-Term Emergency Warplan, - surprisingly approved
unanimously by the JCS, no direct JCS response was provoked by the
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Communist Coup in Prague. The JCS believed that the US was in no
imminent danger of war in the spring of 19^8. (5)
The Berlin Blockade. The Berlin crisis occasioned by what was
seen as Soviet provocations stopping land communication to West
Berlin, was, on the other hand, a cause of greater concern for the
military leaders. However, in neither case did the JCS revise their
perception of Soviet intentions. Repeatedly, the hardline image of
the Soviet desire for communist domination of the world by the use
of every conceivable means short of general war. Some studies made
by the JCS organization show, however, an increased alarm by the
still growing tensions, by the less likelihood of diplomatic
agreement on any important issue, which, acording to the
intelligence advisers, made the international situation more
combustible than in 19^7. The possibility of an outbreak of local
wars and of their escalation to general war was enhanced. (6)
The increased concern resulting from these two incidents seems
to have been caused by the frustration over the political impasse
rather than caused by a change in the image of the Soviet
intentions
.
This confirms my suspicion that once the perception of Soviet
intentions was fixed in the summer of 19^6 it remained unchanged;
what really concerned the JCS from then on was what they should
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propose in their military plans if war should come.(7)
Planning for War, 1948.
Once the hostile and aggressive nature of the Soviet Union had
been detected, the military concerned itself with planning for the
case of a general war. The plans were thought to be a response to a
Soviet provocation, a deliberate but limited provocation from Russia
which miscalculated American resolve.
The role of the atomic bomb was most crucial in US strategic
planning. The Winning Weapon by the Yale historian Gregg Herken and
especially the article on the Hydrogen Bomb decision by David
Rosenberg offer valuable insights on this point. (8)
"Grabber” was the 19^8 version of the first theoretical plan for
war with Russia called "Pincher,” drawn up in the summer of 1946.
Herken points out that "Grabber” was still a "tentative” plan which
reflected the Chiefs' uncertainty of American ability to respond to
a war situation. (9)
The war plans "Pincher”, "Broiler” and "Grabber" deserve further
attention, because the plans illustrate very well the step by step
development in the JCS perception of the Russian threat in terms of
perception of own capabilities and in terms of perception of Soviet
capabilities.
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"Fincher'* wes the first of a series of Joint Basic
Outline Plans, (JBOWP) .which were drafted beginning the late spring
of 19^6.(10) "Fincher” anticipated a repeat of WW II. The plan was
for a conventional war three years later; it assumed that the
American atomic monopoly was not broken.
"Fincher" assumed that Russian capabilities consisted of much
Isrger ground and tactical air force with limited range than the
Western Allies, The Russian naval forces were not frightening, but
the fleet of submarines was found to be impressive. According to
the plans, the war would begin with a Soviet attack on the Western
Allies, The Soviet forces could overrun West Eureope very quickly.
They would destroy allied occupation forces in Germany and seize the
Channel coast of France and the Lowlands in order to neutralize
Great Britain, Spain would be passed through to get to the
Mediterranean, France would be seized. They would take Turkey and
the Middle East to gain control of th eastern Mediterranean and of
the oil of the Middle East, Yugoslavia would take care of Greece
and parts of Italy,
"Fincher" reveals JCS uncertainty about American capabilities,
and JCS concern about a large standing Fed Army, It furthermore
reveals that the JCS had limited knowledge about the stockpile and
1
the rate of peacetime production of the atomic bomb. Bases in
Europe were supposed to be established for strategic air offensives
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against vital industrial centers and against population centers in
the Soviet Union. These air offensive strikes were the only hope
for allied victory. There was a list of 2o targets and an
indication of which bases the targets could be reached from.(n)
The James Schnabel, a JCS historian, does not mention the
drawback regarding these targets. Herken points out that in order
to reach these targets the aircraft had to travel a distance that
exceeded the capacity of the bombers of the time. Goals set forth
by the new plans. "Broiler” and "Grabber." did not change the fact
that there was a difference between goal and capacity, i.e.. the
number of bombers to carry out the planned atomic raids and enough
trops to perform evacution functions. ( 12)
"Broiler" and "Frol ic"/"Grabber"
.
In August 19^7 "Fincher" was
developed into a Joint War Plan called "Broiler". It was another
plan to meet hostilities forced upon the US by Soviet aggression
within a frame of three years. As in "Fincher" the allies of the US
would be Canada and Great Britain.
(
1
3
)
"Grabber" 's assumption of the use of atomic bombs is a clear
departure from "Fincher", because it indicates an increased
confidence in the military advantage of the atomic bomb.
Furthermore, political rather than industrial factors had become
more important in the selection of the targets, stressing the
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psychological effects rather than the devastating effects on Soviet
industry. (1^0
Finally, "Broiler” assumed the war goals were the defeat of
Russia and a liberation of East Europe compelling Soviet withdrawal
to 1939 boundaries and a political restructuring of the its Union to
ensure Soviet abandonment of its policies of political and military
aggression. (15)
In March 19^8 the JCS approved an abbreviated version of the
plan for future planning.
War Viewed by individuals.
Below the JCS level, the plans and the question of the
decisiveness of the atomic bomb were the subject of considerable
disagreement. The JCS was not able to take any formal action on
”Frolic"/"Grabber".(16)
Admiral Leahy approved "Grabber," but had reservations regarding
the use of atomic bombs. He had never been an advocate of the bomb
and saw it as a danger for the military ethic, which he supported,
of separating civil and military targets. (17)
The Early Admirals' Revolt. The Chief of Naval Operation, (CNO),
6H
Admiral Denfeld argued against an excessive reliance upon an atomic
offensive as indicated in "Frolic" and "Broiler". Denfeld was also
very concerned about the abandonment of Western Europe to the
Soviets without a struggle. The warplan was in conflict with US
foreign policy and national objectives, he said. The plan accepted
the loss of the Mediterranean leaving the oil of the Middle East
inadequately defended.
Was Denfeld 's argument against the plan caused by lack of an
appropiate naval role rather than concern for the decisiveness of
the air offensive? Her ken seems to think so: '’Unmentioned by
Denfeld in his memo, but in fact at the heart of his objection to
"Grabber" was its willingness to abandon the Middle East and the
Mediterranean, from which the Navy hoped to stage carrier-launched
atomic strikes against Russia in wartime" .( 1 8) The same author
mentions also that Denfeld pointed out two overseen assumptions of
the plan: (a)that the President would automatically authorize the
use of atomic bombs, and (b)that Russia would fold up after the
initial atomic attack. (19)
Therefore, Denfeld' s criticism seems to go beyond the concern
for the role of the Navy. He stresses that the atomic offensive
would have to be carried out at extreme ranges and against heavy
opposition. If they turned out to be unsuccessful, the initial loss
would be on such a scale that ultimate victory would be extremely
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uncertain. The strategy he argued overemphasized Soviet capabilites
and underestimated the potential capabilities of the Allies of the
US. (20)
The Denfeld criticism thus contained both elements derived from
a concern for a future role of the Navy and from concern for the
plausability about the strategy based upon an offensive atomic
response as the decisive turning point.
The arguments preceded what was to be called the Admirals’
Revolt, which was a week long series of hearings in the House Armed
Service Committee in October 19^9, following the cancellation of the
production of the super-carrier ”USS United States." The admirals
called the Air Force's reliance on the B-36 bomber a billion dollar
blunder
. (21)
The reaction to the Navy’s arguments from the government and the
public was very negative, and Denfeld was fired. (22) There was a
disgust with the Navy’s arguments seemingly selfish concern in the
name of national security. The argument amongst the services over
who was going to deliver the atomic bomb to the Russians was so
intense that the American government felt it necessary to calm the
Russians about the likelihood of any such action. (23) The Russians
had had their first atomic test in September 19^9 and the debate
surfaced in October.
Nevertheless, the core of the debate seems to be the confidence
of the decisive effects of offensive bombing.
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Re port. During late 1948. an ad hoc committee headed by
a senior Air Force officer. Lieutenant General Hubert Harmon, was
analyzing the effects of an atomic offensive through May 1949. it
was, according to Rosenberg, one of the major strategic analyses of
the early cold war
,
based on an extensive study of intelligence and
interviews with leading experts. (24) Its conclusion was approved
unanimously. It contained severe criticism and concern over the
atom blitz which was the core in War plan "Grabber”.
The Harmon Report argues that strategic air offensives would
reduce Soviet industrial capacity by 30 to 40?. Atomic offensives
would not bring about capitulation, nor destroy communism or weaken
the power of the Soviet leaders. The psychological effects of use
of atomic bombs could turn out to be counterproductive. It would
furthermore create destructive reactions detrimental to destructive
effects which would complicate post-hostilities. (25)
In sum, the Harmon Report emphasized the psychological
disadvantages that should be anticipated by any use of atomic bombs
against the Soviet Union, and warned that the atomic bomb was not a
decisive weapon in a general war against the Soviet Union.
Inter-Service Rivalry. The inter-service rivalry is not an
exclusive American phenomenon. Discussion about the functions and
the role of the services prevented the US from getting a unified
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strategy at this point. (26) Samuel Huntington argues that the
interservice rivalry was a child of unification, whereas Stein
claims that the rivalry was caused by the fixed ceilings on the
total military budget. (27)
The above mentioned dimensions of the conflict were all present
at the heated meetings in October about the 1950 budget. (28) The
14.1 billion dollar level or national bankruptcy attitude that the
Truman administration used must certainly have increased the pains
and the strains within the newly unified military organization. (29)
There is little doubt that the JCS thought the reasons for the
lack of comprehensive planning were political. In my mind, however,
it is more conceivable that is was a chain of factors that produced
the situation; the deadlock was due to a lack of understanding by
Truman of the incompatible nature of the alternatives between which
decisions were to be made, i.e., small budget vs large conventional
forces.
In May 1948 Truman rejected Halfmoon, a JCS approved postwar
Joint Emergency War Plan, the keystone of which was the destructive
and psychological power of the atomic weapons against Soviet
military capability,
(
30 ) Instead a plan should be made based on
conventional forces alone. Ironically, the decision of rejecting a
plan based on the atomic bomb started a process which made final
American dependence on an atomic air offensive.
(
31 )
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The small budget made it impossible to meet the requirements of
a conventional type of force, i.e., the only way the JCS saw an
emergency could be met in a war with Russia would be air strikes
from Cairo-Suez area or bases in the British Isles. The
decisiveness of such a plan was questioned by a competent committee
which made a profound study based upon intelligence and other
relevant material. The services became dependent upon a weapon upon
which they had no real confidence, except perhaps for the Air Force
- a confidence that was further moderated by the military's
perception of domestic opinion, which they feared would not let the
military use the atomic bomb. This public opinion questioned
further the bomb's value as a deterrent of war.
Conclusions.
By 19^8 the international political system had become more
bipolarized. The increased tensions between the superpowers were
expressed by the first grave cold war crises - the coup in Prague
and the blockade of Berlin - which brought along the first fear of
war into the postwar system.
The adversary relationship with the Soviet Union evidently
provided a new determinant for the external threat to the US: the US
had gotten a powerful enemy in peacetime for the first time.
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Once the enemy had been identified, the military advisers
suggestions for a proper military posture were more frequently
expressed in plans of war: the war planning was intensified and by
1947 it had evolved into three categories: (a)emergency plans for
the immediate implementation for the forces at the current time,
(b)intermediate plans which were based upon budget and industrial
mobilization two years ahead and (c)long-range plans forcasting
trends eight to years into the future.
As we saw, the JCS planners expected a repeat of WW II or rather
the process of the previous war would take place on the basis of the
increased mobility and firepower that had resulted from the
technological innovations developed during the war. The atomic bomb
was just a bigger bomb and did not impose any need for strategic
revisions.
The plans foresaw that the new enemy - very similar to the
former enemy in important respects such as incompatible nature of
the political regime and its intent and threatening amount of
military-industrial resources - would proceed like the former enemy
by taking most of Europe and the Middle East. To be sure, the JCS
warplans provided for measures to be taken after major parts of
Europe and the Middle East had fallen. The decisive turning point
would be the air offensive against the Soviet Union's main
industrial, political and population centers, as the decisive
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element for the defeat of Germany had been according to popular
wisdom of the time.
Skepticism regarding the decisive effects of such air offensives
which were provided by the major strategic air offensive report
after the war is not seen to have been reflected in the internal
debates. (32) A change of staff prevented the planners to take the
lessons of the report into consideration. The lack of corporate
memory is a critique raised against the JCS organization to which
staff officers by statute only can be assigned for three years and
not reassigned for the next three years. (33)
However, the Harmon Report and the "Early Revolt of the
Admirals" show that there was indeed a discussion concerning the
plausibility of the atomic air offensive as the decisive turning
point in a possible war with the Soviet Union. In fact, the Harmon
Report concluded with an explicit warning against the use of atomic
bombs during such offensives. Regardless, by 19^8 the warplans were
based upon a reliance on the atomic bombs.
There is little doubt that the JCS perceived the politically
imposed ceiling on the total military budget as the major
determinant for their planning. The budgetary ceilings were only
one factor in an array of constraining elements such as the
inter-service rivalry between the Navy and the Air Force, the
discussions over the decisive elements of the envisioned strategies.
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the skepticism regarding the atomic bomb, and the conflicting nature
of the political demands for economy as well as conventional defense
capability. This caused a significant frustration among the JCS
planners.
We shall now see how events in June 1950 provided for a new
political atmosphere which brought about the means for the
realization of the planning ideas.
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CHAPTER IV
WHAT CAN THE ENEMY DO?
The Setting 1 950.
Tine International System. International stability seems to have
been restored temporarily by the Truman administration's responses
to what was seen as Russian provocations in the crises of 19^18
By 1950, the international system was characterized by a
military px5lar ization created through formal military peacetime
alliances, in addition to the already existing political
polarization.
Inter-State Relations. The US-USSR relationship was still
growing more antagonistic. Conflicts over issues from the
settlement of WW II had not been resolved. The North Korean attempt
to resolve the Korean issue through a massive armed invasion of
South Korea almost succeded. The invasion of South Korea was seen
by Washington as directed from Moscow. It was the climax of the
growing tensions that had characterized the relationship between the
two superpowers since 19^5.
The JCS Perception of Soviet Capabilities.
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Of capabilities and intentions, the two main elements in the
perception of the external threat to the US, it seems as if the JCS
planners deduce what the Soviet Union will do, from what they can
do, i.e., that the planners deduce the intentions from the
capabilities. We shall see how.
The Implications of U]e Soviet Atomic Test. A major change in JCS
perception of the Soviet capabilities followed the Soviet atomic
test in September 19^9. During the remaining part of 19H9 and the
following year the JCS undertook revisions of the studies of Soviet
capabilites based upon a series of estimates. They were preoccupied
with what to do.
The explosion of the Russian atomic bomb broke the American
atomic monopoly. Longrange war plans like Dropshot, which outlined
the scenario for atomic warfare against Russia in 1957, were
dropped.(l)
The Joint Emergency War Plan named "Offtackle", which had been
approved by the JCS as late as December 1949, noted that the USSR
would not have an atomic bomb available in FY 1950.(2) The plan
differed from its predecessor, Halfmoon-Fleetwood-Doublestar
,
by a
less exaggerated view of Soviet capabilites and by stressing
coordination with the new allies. The importance of the Middle East
oil was downgraded
.( 3)
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During this time very little emphasis was placed on Russian
intentions; Russia’s capabilities were the principal concern. It
seemed more frigthening what the Russians would do, now that they
could do it, i.e., "Pearl Harborize" American defenses. A JCS
document argued that:
As the Soviet stockpile of atomic bombs increases, however, the
danger of a paralyzing surprise attack by the Soviets against the
United States is also increased, if their capability of delivery has
increased proportionately and if the United States defenses remain
at about their present strength. "(^O
The citation clearly indicates increased concern for capability
over intentions. Furthermore, the same document offers evidence for
the military reasoning in this respect. "Full reliance," it said,
"can never be placed upon military intentions since it is impossible
to know the minds of one's opponents and practically impossible to
know and weigh accurately the factors from an opposite viewpoint.
It is most important," claims the JCS, "that any assessment of the
risks inherent in the United Statess situation of disparity of
military forces vis-a-vis the USSR be made with the military
capabilities of the USSR in mind rather than Soviet intentions. "(5)
As a matter of fact, it was not the event of the explosion as
much as the incorrectness of the planners' assumptions regarding
Russia and the bomb that stunned the JCS organization. (6) The focus
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on Russian capabilities created an atmosphere of fear and
uncertainty in which officials failed to reexamine the political and
military assumptions. Such a reexamination was sought by Lilienthal
and Kennan. But by 1950 Kennan had lost his influence. (7)
In my opinion, the change in the relative weight of focus on the
Russian intentions during the first postwar years to the focus of
Soviet capabilites at the end of the decade may have been
ing
,
because it precluded any concern for a possible
change in Russian diplomacy towards a more cooperative attitude on
the major issues of conflict which may have been indicated since the
Russian's felt less insecure.
Invasion of South Korea
.
The invasion of South Korea was the
climax of the growing tensions between the superpowers since the
war. Unlike the NSC's intial report, NSC 73, that expected the
invasion to be an isolated incident, the JCS expected that it was a
part of an all-encompassing Soviet plan. The JSC argued that the
NSC 73 underestimated further aggression. JCS believed that a
progressive series of piecemeal attacks from the periphery of the
USSR should be taken as a warning that the Soviets might wish to
initiate a third world war. The JCS stressed the growing Soviet
military capabilites and voiced the need to strengthen the power
position of the non-communist world. It believed that the US should
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abandon a purely defensive policy, and suggested instead a
political, economic and psychological offensive. The offensive
should take place via the UN. The JCS warned, however, that
reliance on the UN as the sole instrumentality for any of the US
vital security interests would be unwise. (8)
The fall of China” and the Soviet bomb had given the conditions
for deciding on the H-bomb in January 1950. The NSC 68 papers
outlined the goals for American security and prescribed the means
especially for the conventional forces. The invasion of South Korea
provided a climate for approval of money to do what the military had
proposed ever since the early years of the cold war.
The unexpected early bomb for some planners had indicated that
the Soviet Union might start a war not out of miscalculation. The
JCS seems to have revised its perception on Soviet intentions after
June 1950, as we just saw regarding the comments regarding the
invasion
.
In August 1950 an ad-hoc committee to the Joint Intelligence
Committee, (JIC)
,
reveals a rare theoretical sophistication in the
forcasting of Soviet moves. In most of the reports studied
regarding this subject, the Soviet hostile intentions basically were
deduced from the aggressive nature of a totalitarian regime,
referring to the Soviet policies and demands against the US desires
as evidence that confirmed the perception.
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The JIC report states that the Soviets would risk a war despite
their belief that the downfall of capitalism is inevitable. The
report, in referring to actions and policy statements, argues that
the Soviets see an inevitable downfall through the use of force or
revolutionary uprising whenever expedient. A major war is the
requisite to the establishment of a communist dominated world.
The report continues that there is still extensive support for
the idea that the Soviets would attempt to reach their goal of world
domination without resorting to armed force. Some believe that
Soviet faith in the decay and ultimate collapse of the capitalist
world would tend to deter the Soviets from unnecessary use of armed
force. On the other hand, the report indicates that Soviet doctrine
emphasizes that the politics and war are inseparable in achieving
international objectives. The JIC refers to the Stalin dogma that
war is simply politics by violence. Korea thus corresponds to
Soviet doctrine. (9)
The invasion of South Korea made the JCS revise its view of
Soviet intentions; although the JCS perception of Soviet political
intentions had become more sophisticated, the JCS view of Soviet
political aims remained the same as it had been established during
19^6. The JCS perception of Soviet military intentions assumed an
increased Soviet aggressiveness. The JCS now questioned the
validity of prior assessments of the Soviet threat which rested upon
the assumption that the USSR would not start a war except by
miscalculation
.
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These assumptions had already been incorporated in NSC 68, the
first draft of which had been forwarded to Truman in April 1950. A
revised version, NSC 68/2, was approved by the President on
September 30, when events seemed to have confirmed the paper's
validity. The NSC 68 paper became the definitive statement of
American national security policy. (10)
Increased Militarization of the Cold War.
The NSC 68 study can be regarded as a culmination of the process
of cold war policy formulation which was initiated by Kennan's
"Long Telegram" in February 19^6. The paper was not drafted in the
NSC, but in a special interdepartamental study group of members of
the Departments of State and Defense.
As part of the decision to build the super bomb, the hydrogen
bomb, Truman requested a review of the cold war policy. Paul M.
Nitze, who succeeded Kennan as director of the Policy Planning
Staff, (PPS), of the State Department became the chairman of the
interdepartamental study group. The NSC 68 can be understood as the
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final drafting of the containment policy which initiated by the an
interdepartamental effort, the Clifford report, in the late summer
of 19116.
The actual drafting of NSC 68 and the weight of the analysis
indicated two important differencies from the Clifford report in
terms of (a)JCS participation and (b)preoccupation with Soviet
military capabilities.
NSC 68. The JCS recommendations of late fall of 1949 and
January 1950 carried a lot of weight in Truman's decision to build
the h-bomb. The JCS had only a peripheral role in the drafting of
NSC 68.(11) The JCS role regarding the NSC 68 was that of approval.
The Joint Strategic Survey Committee
, (JSSC)
,
represented JCS in the
State-Defense collaboration; it did not involve any delegation of
JCS authority. ( 12) Among the JSSC members only Major General Truman
H. Landon, USAF, actually attended the sessions of the Study Group
that drafted the paper
. The JCS had in fact decided against having
a JCS representative on the State-Defense study group. The decision
was consistent with long-standing JCS policy.
(
13 ) The budgetary
policy of the Defense Department was challenged by the PPS people.
The JSSC men did at first demonstrate views loyal to the current
policy, but were not long in coming to agreement with the PPS
members of the Study Group. The Study Group's recommendations
assumed a sharp increase in defense spending.
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The JCS agreed with the JSSC endorsement of the JSC paper and
offered to promote the views if necessary. In fact the JCS urged
that the entire
-Staff Study” be supplied to Truman and not merely
the summary report. The JCS advice was followed. Both Secretaries
Acheson and Johnson endorsed the plan. Johnson's endorsement came
as a surprise considering Johnson's public stand on the economy. (1H)
Perhaps Johnson's recommendation was based upon the favorable
opinions rendered by the JCS, the Service Secretaries and the
chairman of the Munition's Board. (15)
Although the JCS had little influence on the drafting of the
study, which was dominated by the State Department, the paper only
continued on already ongoing trend in the JCS perception of the
external threat. The JCS was hardly opposed to the prospects of
increase in the military budget.
NSC 68 '
s
View of Soviet Military Capabilities. The NSC 68 reflects
an analysis that is based predominantly upon Soviet military
capabilities. Perception of Soviet intentions derived simply from a
perception of Soviet capabilities. The traditional concern of
Soviet conventional military strength compared with American
weakness was replaced by a new concern for Soviet nuclear
capabilities. The study projected that, by 195^, the USSR could
produce 200 atomic bombs which would make the USSR able to lay waste
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the British Isles, destroy Western European industrial centers and
deliver devastating attacks upon the U.S.(16)
Because the Soviets devoted twice as large a proportion of their
GNP to military purposes, the USSR was widening the preparedness gap
over the Western Powers. Soviet capabilities in the year of 1950
were 175 divisions of which 55 were armored or mechanized, 18,000 -
20,000 aircraft and 250-300 submarines. Soviet block forces could
overrun Western Europe, except the Iberian and Scandinavian
peninsulas, launch air attacks against the British Isles and launch
atomic attacks against selected targets in North America and the
United Kingdom. (17)
The USSR was approaching military superiority. If the current
trend continued the Western Powers would not be able to oppose
effectively Communist military power even in I960.
Diplomacy was not a likely way to settle the cold war. Of four
courses open to the US, the NSC 68 recommended a build up of
political, economic and military strength in the free world. (18)
This course was recommended over the option of war, which the US was
not perceived able of winning quickly, over the option of pre-WW II
isolation, which would be a capitulatipn and would reduce US
retaliatory capabilities, and over the option of continuation of the
current policies, which would entail a continuing relative decline
in US military capabilities. ( 1 9)
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The Korean War created a climate of national emergency by the
end of the year in the climate of which it became politically
possible to start the conventional rearmament that was desired by
NSC 68. In early July, the JCS had set, optimistically, FY 1952
force objectives to 10 divisions, 218 combatant vessels and 58
wings. (20) The NSC accepted in NSC 68/3 in fact JCS force targets
for FY 1954 as force objectives for FY 1952.(21) The administration
accepted 18 divisions 397 vessels and 95 wings. Truman approved the
plan as NSC 68/4 in December of 1950.(22) It said: "The aggression
by the Chinese Communists in North Korea has created a new crisis
and a situation of great danger. Our military build-up must be
rapid because the period of greatest danger is directly before us.
A greatly increased scale and tempo of effort is required to enable
is to overcome our present military inadequacy (23)
Conclusion.
NSC 68’s design for conventional rearmament of the US military
and the later approval was a major turning point in the history of
the cold war policy making. It did not indicate a change of the JCS
perception of the Soviet threat. The real change was in the
perception of government officials to abandon the belief of
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dangerous inflationary increases following increase in military
spending. The principal concern now was the change in Soviet
military capabilities that had occurred in the fall of as a
consequence of the unexpected early Soviet atomic test. The JCS
believed that the danger of war was enhanced, because of the
increased military capabilities of the USSR. The North Korean
invasion of South Korea was a first proof of the validity of their
perception. The Korean War entailed a massive conventional
rearmament. The H-bomb decision demonstrated tendency of the
traditional warplanning to balance the US weakness in conventional
forces with nuclear deterrence.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
International System at Mid-Century. The 19^5 American dream
was a future world order of cooperation under international law, a
world free from spheres of influence and from exclusive alliances, a
world order not based on the balance of power but on self
determination and democracy regulating from the international
organization of all peace-loving nations.
The 1950 reality was radically different on all these points.
And so was the American view of the world. Raymond Aron calls the
transformation that took place from 1945 to 1947 "the finest hour of
American diplomacy. "( 1 ) Truman had accepted Stalin's view of
international relations. Aron seems to indicate, however, that
American diplomacy learned the lesson too well, i.e. the American
perception became too schematic. I agree.
JCS Perceptions.
The JCS Perception of Soviet Intentions. In chapter two we saw that
within the American government in 19^6, the top military advisers,
(the JCS), were concerned with the external threat to American
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security.
In this paper, I have dealt with the perception of the Soviet
Union’s intentions and capabilities in the first years of the cold
war and the interrelated perception of US capabilities. In the
formative years of the cold war, the focus of the JCS seemed to
change from a concern of what the Soviet intentions were in I9146 to
what American capabilites were. Ironically it seems as if the fears
of American weakness, due to the unexpected intensive demobization
or liquidation of American military forces, determined the
perception of Soviet intentions as much as the events, if not more.
The military concern over American inability to defend Western
Europe has long been known. The present study indicates that the
anxiety was an ever present element in the JCS's perception of
Soviet intentions and capabilities.
The JCS seems to have become increasingly concerned with Soviet
intentions as US demobilization proceeded. The first studies of
Soviet postwar intentions and capabilities were intiated for this
reason. The JCS feared that the military was not able to resist or
defend any Soviet military activity against Western Europe.
(
2 )
The perception of Soviet intentions changed from viewing Soviet
policy during the very first months of the postwar era as part of a
pattern of defensive Russian expansionism to a view of Soviet policy
as part of an aggressive bid for Soviet domination. Although the
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evidence given for the Russian motives seem hasty and simplistic -
assuming such behavior of a totalitarian regime - there is no
evidence in the documents that I have seen that indicates that the
JSC purposely developed a threat because they needed one.
Such a thesis has been advanced by several scholars, such as
Yergin and Sherry. In order to justify the raison d'etre for an
extensive peacetime military force, it is claimed that the military
needed a threat of considerable magnitude and likelihood to change
the traditional American anti-military attitude not to reduce the
military back to prewar insignificanse and isolation. Sherry
demonstrates that key military figures believed that the only thing
that could stop the rate of demobilization was a public awareness of
the external threat.
Moreover
,
the fear of a repeat of the WW II experience seems to
have been another powerful factor. The Soviet Union was objectively
speaking the only power that fitted the expectation of a future
enemy; it had all the qualifications of a potential enemy.
Did the JCS alarmist perception prompt the cold war? My answer
cannot be conclusive. Most of the top government officials were
concerned about the Soviet intentions. The difference is a matter
of degree: a) concern, b) very concerned and c)alarmed. It does not
break down on institutional affiliation, nor does it break down on
defense or non-defense officials consistently. The problem
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Indicated deserves further study of diaries and other primary
material
.
PjHception of ^oviet ^pabilities. In chapter four we saw that
from late 1945 the JSC planners assumed that the American military
would only be able to defend the Western Hemisphere. The Soviet
Union was perceived as capable of taking without much difficulty
Turkey, Iran, the Persian Gulf, Manchuria, Korea, North China, in no
more than six months. Only Great Britain could be successfully
assisted
American resources for industrial mobilization were greater than
any nation of the world. The core of the problem, however, was that
there would be no time to mobilize the resources, in case of war.
When evaluating Soviet capabilites, the planners frequently stress
the central planning and the lack of public opinion as a Soviet
asset for rapid mobilization of the economy, which would balance
some of the overall weaknesses the Soviet wartime economy would have
relative to the American economy.
The Soviet economy was, however still perceived as too weak
after the war to support a general war. The JCS did not expect that
the Soviets would start a war, except by miscalculation. The JCS
was impressed by Soviet military capability, despite the economic
weakness. The JCS did not ignore the threat that this military
capability posed regardless of Soviet intentions.
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Of the Soviet intentions and capabilities, the JCS seems to have
emphasized the latter more than the former. We saw that the JCS
argued that it is sounder to rely upon what the enemy can do instead
of what enemy would do, because you will never know and weight
accurately the factors from the opposite view point.
Perception of American Capabilities. Chapter three revealed
that the JCS’s proposals were diplomatic as well as military. The
JCS was requested to provide military analyses of the alternative
outcomes of the various international issues of conflict. The
military planning consisted of warplans, which included the tacit
assumptions of who the enemy was and what he was up to. The goals
of the war plans seem to have followed a development similar to the
hardening perception of Soviet intentions. As the early estimate of
Soviet intentions caused concern, the later ones caused alarm. The
military proposals changed from being a pragmatic, moderate response
to become a proposal for absolute defeat of the Soviet regime and
liberation of Eastern Europe.
How did the JCS perceive the domestic political conditions? The
JCS documents reveal that it was aware of domestic conditions such
as a)public pressure for demobilization and a return to a civilian
economy, b)the unwillingness to spend money on defense, c)public
pressure against the use of the atomic bomb reducing the value of
deterrence that the bomb otherwise would have had. There Is no
evidence in the documents that the military perceived the domestic
front as a bigger threat to national security than the external
threat.
The unification of the armed forces by 19H7 was only one of many
domestic constraints outside the military organization that made any
comprehensive strategy possible. The ceiling on the total military
budgets of the Truman administation tended to intensify the debate
between the services of who should do what. What seems to have been
the core of the problem was military skepticism about the
plausibility of the atomic air offensive as the decisive turning
point in any future plan, as wars were planned at the time. This
concern was present together with the disagreement about who should
deliver the bomb. These concerns were publicly debated at the time;
not known was the secret debate within the military establishment
concerning a proper strategy.
The Harmon Report shows the profound nature of the debate. The
Report indicated that the planned atomic offensive would not be
decisive, but rather counterproductive by increasing the Russian
will to resist. It also shows a sophistication in the perception of
Soviet Union in making a distinction between the Russian patriotism
for the nation and the Russians' attachment to the Soviet regime.
It is interesting to note the American Ambassador in Moscow, Walter
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B Smith argued before the Harmon Committee that Moscow was a holy
city that the US should not bomb. The only hope of success was
through the destruction of Central Russia. But he warned that such
a war would be a war of annihilation. (3)
Ironically, despite the serious doubts, the JCS maintained the
strategy, but was not able to reach a final agreement of the
"Grabber” that was based upon the above air offensive, because on
lack of economic means for any alternative.
The Russian atomic test and the "fall of China” in 1949
intensified the planning efforts, which resulted in the famous NSC
68 . The goals and the JCS's perceptions remained basically the
same, although the feeling of emergency was greatly enhanced from
time period to time period that we have examined.
The invasion of South Korea was a climax and a turning point.
However
,
the perception of civilian officials concerned with foreign
policy changed more than the perception of the military officials.
Sources of JCS Perception.
A Strange Pattern
.
My findings show that the pattern of JCS’s
perception and proposals regarding the external threat to the US
security follows a strange course. JCS perception of Soviet
intentions was determined by its views of US capabilities rather
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than an understanding of Soviet behavior and ideology, jcs
perception of Soviet capabilities was determined by its views of
Soviet political and military intentions rather than intelligence
estimates. JCS proposals in terms of military plans were determined
by the experience of WW II. service interests and budgetary ceilings
rather than the lessons of WW II and new technological development.
Organizational Interests or W n ? The shift from the
subjective actor oriented approach in chapter two to the objective
observer oriented approach in chapter three permits us to understand
the relative weight of WW II and the vested organizational
interests. A clear indication of fear of a repeat of the traumatic
experiences of the 1930's and the first half of the 19il0's is
manifested by the analogies between Hitler and Stalin.
The experience was shared by all government officials and
included a certain commonly held belief of social causality, i.e,
diplomatic appeasement vis-a-vis an expansionist power would lead to
war
. Because this belief did not depend upon organizational
affiliation, it may explain why the alarmist hardline view of Soviet
intentions after the war did not break down consistently along the
spectrum of defense - non-defense officials. Organizational
interests of the different services indicate the lack of
comprehensive planning and disagrement of strategy. The war
planning confirms the dictum that generals fight the last wars. But
the warplans were also determined by the scarse funds available.
Even though the JCS may not have been significantly influential
in respect to crises decisions, the JCS may have had a significant
impact when it comes to formulation of policy. The military heroes
of the first JCS of the postwar era carried a lot of weight when
they spoke. The influence of the JCS was determined by WW II rather
than the new role of the US military.
During the period from 1945 to 1950, the JCS sometimes believed
that the Soviets intended to carry out military operations that the
JCS thought the Soviets did not have the military capability to do.
The inconsistency between JCS' perception of Soviet intentions and
capabilities may be explained in terms of vested service interests.
It may also be explained in terms belief of what caused the two
world wars in the 20th century. The textbook explanation of the
cause of WW I is miscalculation and misperception. The textbook
explanation of the cause of WW II is one of betrayal and rational
piecemeal expansionism for world domination. The JCS believed that
the Soviet were pursuing the latter, but at the same time the JCS
feared the former.
Notes.
(1) Aron, R.,
World 19^^5-1973,
^he Imperial Republic
,
United States and the(Englewood Cliffs: Printice Hall, 19714) p Tij;
(2) An indirect support for this argument is that the studies
were discontinued when the JCS found that the responsible
politicians and the public had become properly informed; they did
not believe that the information alone would change the public mood
regarding the demobilization; only the threat of a direct attack
would
.
(3) Minutes 13th Meeting, 16 Februar 19149, Ad - Hoc Committee
CCS 373 (10-23-48)B.P., P.T. No. 2,N.A.
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Figure 1. The National Security Establishment.
Figure 1 shows the agencies of the National Security Establishment
created by the National Security Act in 19^7.
Source: Etzold, T.H., and Gaddis Lewis, J., eds., Containment :
Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 19^5-1950, (N.Y.: 1978), p U
Figure 2. Organization for National Security, 19^71 Representation.
SANAAC: State-Army-Navy-Air Force Cordination Committee.
(Previously SWNCC)
NSRB: National Security Resources Board.
Source, Etzold, T.H., and Gaddis Lewis, J., eds., p 11.
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ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SFCURITY. IW
RcpracniaiHMi
The ii« agcncia m ih« upper tier of ihe chan weta jiaiuiory memben of the
NaiKHial Secumy Counal. The ihree agencies in the Io««t iier punicipaied
in ihc Council's ddiberaiions eiiher mformully nr si presideniiul request
from the beginning of the system s oper.ninos.
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Chart 1, The JCS Organization on 1 November 19^2.
Source: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, A Conc ise History of
of STaff, 19^2 - 1978, Historical DivisiorTT
Secretariat, 1979.
Chart 2. The JCS Organization on 1 April 19^15.
Source : Same source as chart 1.
the
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Chart 3. The JCS Organization on 22 October 19^7
Source: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, _A Concise History of the Organi-
zation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
,
1 9^2 - 1978 , Historical Division,
Joint Secretariat, 1979.
Chart The JCS Organization on 23 August 19^9
Source: As chart 3
JC» 0*CAMI7«TI0N ON tf OCT.ONf * «*4»
TNC JCS organization ON iJ AUGUST
A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
The information for this thesis is provided by official
documents of which there are three kinds. The most accessible is
the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series published
by the State Department. Less accessible is the publication of the
JCS’s Historical Division on the history of the JCS in National
Policy. For the postwar period, only volumes covering the period
until 1952 have become declassified so far. These volumes are an
historical account for the record. The account made by the JCS
historians by means of traditional historical methods, as they put
it, have not been formally approved by the JCS and do not
necessarily reflect their official point of view. The volumes are
thought to have an intructional value for new officers assigned
within the JCS organization. Available are the the unclassified
editions that were provided after the process of declassification of
the original sources. A few pages seem to have been deleted from
the original top secret publication. Otherwise, according to the
Historical Division, the text of unclassified edition has no
addition nor reinterpretation.
The JCS volumes are primarily based on the official documents
contained in the master records files of the JCS, where the majority
of sorces cited in the footnotes have been declassified. This case
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file is identified by the prefix, CCS (Combined Chiefs of Staff),
and is available in the Modern Military Branch of the National
Archives in Washington D.C.It is the least accessible group of
documents used here. It has been used to evaluate the two
categories of publications mentioned before, and deals in depth with
problems
.
The case file system originated in 1942 under the Combined
Chiefs of Staff; therefore the prefix CCS is attached to each file
folder. Each subject matter within broad categories was given a
number and put either in the decimal group for the general material
or in the geographical part, dealing with regions and countries.
Take, for instance, Truman's letter, sent 31 Januar 1950, to the JCS
requesting its proposals concerning a reexamination of US
capabilities. It is the first document in the case that contains
the JCS material for NSC 68. The label is CCS 381 US (1-31-50).
Such a system facilitates later research on a particular subject
matter
.
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